The final exam is written. I’m not a believer in big surprises on final exams, so here is the breakdown.
The exam consists of three questions, each with lots of subparts.
There is one question about taking a 3 by 3 evolutionary matrix game, finding the Nash equilibria both mixed and pure, determining which strategies are ESS, writing out the replicator equations, finding the isoclines, finding the equilibria, computing the Jacobian, using the Jacobian to evaluate the stability of the equilibria, and drawing a picture to summarize your results.
There is one question where you are given the payoff functions of two players. There payoff functions are polynomials in x and y. One player has control over x, one player has control over y. One of the polynomials will be cubic. You will have to find the best response functions of each player, and then use those best response functions to find the Nash equilibria.
One of the question is kind of riddle like. It is very similar the last few games we played as a class.
The exam takes me a little under two hours to complete, so hopefully three hours will be plenty of time for you. I am prepared to run several help sessions over the next week, where we will just walk through examples of the sort of problems that will be on the final. Please post comments suggesting times that work.
I’ll aim to have a practice final up by Saturday, and solutions for it and assignment 8 by Monday.